Ownership Structure , Management Control and Agency Costs : Direct Empirical Evidence

  title={Ownership Structure , Management Control and Agency Costs : Direct Empirical Evidence},
  author={Sridhar Goginenia and Scott C. Linnb and Pradeep K. Yadavb},
  • Sridhar Goginenia, Scott C. Linnb, Pradeep K. Yadavb
  • Published 2013
  • We present new empirical evidence on the agency costs due to inefficiencies which emerge from the vertical (ownership versus control) and horizontal (majority versus minority) agency problems. Using a sample of more than 250,000 public and private firms, we document that agency costs increase as firms move from a single owner/single manager ownership structure to more complicated ownership structures. Within each ownership structure, agency costs are significantly higher when firms are not… CONTINUE READING
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