Ownership Structure, Management Control and Agency Costs

  title={Ownership Structure, Management Control and Agency Costs},
  author={Sridhar Gogineni and Scott C. Linn and Pradeep Kumar Yadav},
We present new empirical evidence on the agency costs due to inefficiencies which emerge from the vertical (ownership versus control) and horizontal (majority versus minority) agency problems. We use a sample of more than 100,000 public and private firms to test the basic predictions of agency theory. We document that agency costs are higher in public firms when compared to a matched sample of private firms. Among private firms, we show that agency costs are significantly higher when firms are… Expand

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