Ownership Dynamics with Large Shareholders: An Empirical Analysis

@inproceedings{Donelli2013OwnershipDW,
  title={Ownership Dynamics with Large Shareholders: An Empirical Analysis},
  author={Marcelo Donelli and B Horacio Larra{\'i}n and Francisco Urz{\'u}a},
  year={2013}
}
We study the empirical determinants of corporate ownership dynamics in a market where large shareholders are prevalent. We use a unique, hand-collected 20-year dataset on the ownership structure of Chilean companies. Controllers’ blockholdings are on average high -as in continental Europe, for instanceand quite stable over time. Controllers still make nontrivial changes to their holdings through issuance and block trades. In a typical year controllers’ blockholdings decrease (increase) by 5… CONTINUE READING

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