Ownership-Control Discrepancy and Firm Value : Evidence from France ♣

@inproceedings{Boubaker2003OwnershipControlDA,
  title={Ownership-Control Discrepancy and Firm Value : Evidence from France ♣},
  author={Sabri Boubaker},
  year={2003}
}
The purpose of this study is to provide an empirical analysis of the relationship between ownership structure of French firms and their value. Using data for 510 French publicly traded firms, the current study provides evidence in support of the entrenchment hypothesis. The results show that large controlling shareholders maintaining grip on control while holding only a small fraction of cash flow rights are inclined to expropriate minority shareholders, which in turn detrimentally affects the… CONTINUE READING

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