Overconfidence in Probability and Frequency Judgments: A Critical Examination

  title={Overconfidence in Probability and Frequency Judgments: A Critical Examination},
  author={Lyle A. Brenner and Derek J. Koehler and Varda Liberman and Amos Tversky},
  journal={Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes},
The overconfidence observed in calibration studies has recently been questioned on both psychological and methodological grounds. In the first part of the article we discuss these issues and argue that overconfidence cannot be explained as a selection bias, and that it is not eliminated by random sampling of questions. In the second part of the article, we compare probability judgments for single events with judgments of relative frequency. Subjects received a target individual's personality… 

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