Overconfidence: It Depends on How, What, and Whom You Ask.

  title={Overconfidence: It Depends on How, What, and Whom You Ask.},
  author={Klayman and Soll and Gonz{\'a}lez-Vallejo and Barlas},
  journal={Organizational behavior and human decision processes},
  volume={79 3},
  • KlaymanSoll Barlas
  • Published 1 September 1999
  • Psychology
  • Organizational behavior and human decision processes
Many studies have reported that the confidence people have in their judgments exceeds their accuracy and that overconfidence increases with the difficulty of the task. However, some common analyses confound systematic psychological effects with statistical effects that are inevitable if judgments are imperfect. We present three experiments using new methods to separate systematic effects from the statistically inevitable. We still find systematic differences between confidence and accuracy… 

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