Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting

  title={Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting},
  author={Brandice Canes-Wrone and David W. Brady and John F. Cogan},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={127 - 140}
Does a typical House member need to worry about the electoral ramifications of his roll-call decisions? We investigate the relationship between incumbents' electoral performance and roll-call support for their party—controlling for district ideology, challenger quality, and campaign spending, among other factors—through a series of tests of the 1956–1996 elections. The tests produce three key findings indicating that members are indeed accountable for their legislative voting. First, in each… Expand
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