• Corpus ID: 118966664

Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy in the Research on the Foundations of Quantum Physics: E.P. Wigner's Case #

@article{Freire2006OrthodoxyAH,
  title={Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy in the Research on the Foundations of Quantum Physics: E.P. Wigner's Case \#},
  author={Olival Freire},
  journal={arXiv: History and Philosophy of Physics},
  year={2006}
}

• O. Freire
• Published 4 February 2006
• Physics
• arXiv: History and Philosophy of Physics

Dealing with Eugene Wigner’s ideas on the measurement procedure in quantum physics and unearthing the controversy that pitted him against supporters of the interpretation of complementarity, I will show how Wigner and his followers contributed to the defeat of a seemingly unshakeable consensus. In fact, although he intended to defend what seemed to him to be orthodoxy, he himself became a heterodox. I suggest that Wigner’s conjectures on the role of consciousness in physical phenomena were not fruitful and were discarded, being today part of the history of physics rather than physics proper. However, his ideas and actions left an indelible mark on the physics of the second half of the 20 th century. Namely, he formulated his ideas in opposition to the “Copenhagen monocracy,” which held a stronghold on the interpretation of quantum physics until the late 1960s; he stressed the unsolved status of the measurement problem; and he effectively defended his ideas and supported those who were willing to investigate the foundations of quantum physics. He thus contributed to the creation of a new field of physical research, that of the foundations of quantum physics, which attributed a higher scientific status to the old controversy on the interpretations and foundations of this theory. This new field has had to deal with important theoretical, experimental, and philosophical issues, and significant repercussions have arisen in the last decades. The intrinsic historic worth of Wigner’s case should be enough to justify its inclusion in a book organized to criticize the hubris of the contemporary scientism and to suggest, instead, the role of prudent knowledge for a decent life. However, Wigner’s case