Origins of Early Democracy

  title={Origins of Early Democracy},
  author={Ali Ahmed and David Stasavage},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={502 - 518}
The idea that rulers must seek consent before making policy is key to democracy. We suggest that this practice evolved independently in a large fraction of human societies where executives ruled jointly with councils. We argue that council governance was more likely to emerge when information asymmetries made it harder for rulers to extract revenue, and we illustrate this with a theoretical model. Giving the population a role in governance became one means of overcoming the information problem… 

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    American Political Science Review
  • 2008
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    American Political Science Review
  • 2012
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