Organizing Violence

@article{Bates2002OrganizingV,
  title={Organizing Violence},
  author={Robert H. Bates and Avner Greif and Smita Singh},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  year={2002},
  volume={46},
  pages={599 - 628}
}
In stateless societies, coercion is privately provided; violence is employed to engage in, and to defend against, predation. At best, violence results in mere redistribution; being destructive, it more often results in a loss of social welfare. When organized, however, violence can be socially productive; it can be employed to defend property rights, thereby strengthening the incentives to engage in productive activity. To explore how violence can be rendered a source of welfare, the authors… 
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Highly Influential Citations
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202 Citations

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