Corpus ID: 15349751

Organismically-inspired robotics : homeostatic adaptation and teleology beyond the closed sensorimotor loop

  title={Organismically-inspired robotics : homeostatic adaptation and teleology beyond the closed sensorimotor loop},
  author={E. D. Paolo},
In 1972, and later in 1979, at the peak of the golden era of Good Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI), the voice of philosopher Hubert Dreyfus made itself heard as one of the few calls against the hubristic programme of modelling the human mind as a mechanism of symbolic information processing (Dreyfus, 1979). He did not criticise particular solutions to specific problems; instead his deep concern was with the very foundations of the programme. His critical stance was unusual, at… Expand

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