Ordinality in non cooperative games

@article{Mertens2004OrdinalityIN,
  title={Ordinality in non cooperative games},
  author={Jean-François Mertens},
  journal={International Journal of Game Theory},
  year={2004},
  volume={32},
  pages={387-430}
}
  • J. Mertens
  • Published 1 June 2004
  • Economics
  • International Journal of Game Theory
Abstract.We first analyse what a conceptual definition of ordinality for non cooperative games should be. The resulting concept is highly abstract and apparently unmanageable. Nevertheless we obtain in a second part a very simple and fully operational characterization. In the last part, this is used to check the ordinality of a number of concepts that have been proposed in the literature. 

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