Corpus ID: 215786517

Optimal protocols for the most difficult repeated coordination games

  title={Optimal protocols for the most difficult repeated coordination games},
  author={Antti Kuusisto and Raine R{\"o}nnholm},
This paper investigates repeated win-lose coordination games (WLC-games). We analyse which protocols are optimal for these games covering both the worst case and average case scenarios, i,e., optimizing the guaranteed and expected coordination times. We begin by analysing Choice Matching Games (CM-games) which are a simple yet fundamental type of WLC-games, where the goal of the players is to pick the same choice from a finite set of initially indistinguishable choices. We give a complete… Expand
1 Citations
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  • Jérôme Renault
  • Computer Science
  • Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science
  • 2009
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