Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information

@article{Schmitz2021OptimalOO,
  title={Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information},
  author={Patrick W. Schmitz},
  journal={Journal of Public Economics},
  year={2021}
}
  • P. Schmitz
  • Published 1 June 2021
  • Economics
  • Journal of Public Economics
1 Citations

Figures and Tables from this paper

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Предмет: Основным предметом исследований в работе являются правоотношения, возникающие при привлечении частных инвестиций в формате концессии и государственно частного партнерства для реализации

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