Optimal mechanism design and money burning

  title={Optimal mechanism design and money burning},
  author={Jason D. Hartline and Tim Roughgarden},
Mechanism design is now a standard tool in computer science for aligning the incentives of self-interested agents with the objectives of a system designer. There is, however, a fundamental disconnect between the traditional application domains of mechanism design (such as auctions) and those arising in computer science (such as networks): while monetary "transfers" (i.e., payments) are essential for most of the known positive results in mechanism design, they are undesirable or even… CONTINUE READING
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Bidding rings

  • R. P. McAfee, J. McMillan
  • American Economic Review, 82:579–599
  • 1992
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