Optimal bidding in online auctions

  title={Optimal bidding in online auctions},
  author={Dimitris Bertsimas and Jeff Hawkins and Georgia Perakis},
  journal={Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management},
Online auctions are arguably one of the most important and distinctly new applications of the Internet. The predominant player in online auctions, eBay, has over 42 million users, and it was the host of over $9.3 billion worth of goods sold just in the year 2001. Using methods from approximate dynamic programming and integer programming, we design algorithms for optimally bidding for a single item in an online auction, and in simultaneous or overlapping multiple online auctions. We report… 

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