Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions

  title={Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions},
  author={Jan Boone and Peter Fredriksson and Bertil Holmlund},
Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring… CONTINUE READING
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