Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

  title={Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake},
  author={Matheus V. X. Ferreira and Ye Lin Sally Hahn and S. Matthew Weinberg and Catherine Yu},
  journal={Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},
Cryptographic Self-Selection is a subroutine used to select a leader for modern proof-of-stake consensus protocols. In cryptographic self-selection, each round r has a seed Qr. In round r, each account owner is asked to digitally sign Qr, hash their digital signature to produce a credential, and then broadcast this credential to the entire network. A publicly-known function scores each credential in a manner so that the distribution of the lowest scoring credential is identical to the… 

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