Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent

@inproceedings{Crmer2015OptimalSS,
  title={Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent},
  author={Jacques Cr{\'e}mer and Richard P. McLean},
  year={2015}
}
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