Corpus ID: 232068702

Optimal Pricing of Information

@article{Liu2021OptimalPO,
  title={Optimal Pricing of Information},
  author={Shuze Liu and Weiran Shen and Haifeng Xu},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2021},
  volume={abs/2102.13289}
}
A decision maker looks to take an active action (e.g., purchase some goods or make an investment). The payoff of this active action depends on his own private type as well as a random and unknown state of nature. To decide between this active action and another passive action, which always leads to a safe constant utility, the decision maker may purchase information from an information seller. The seller can access the realized state of nature, and this information is useful for the decision… Expand

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References

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