• Corpus ID: 13043182

Optimal Platform Design

  title={Optimal Platform Design},
  author={Jason D. Hartline and Tim Roughgarden},
An auction house cannot generally provide the optimal auction technology to every client. Instead it provides one or several auction technologies, and clients select the most appropriate one. For example, eBay provides ascending auctions and "buy-it-now" pricing. For each client the offered technology may not be optimal, but it would be too costly for clients to create their own. We call these mechanisms, which emphasize generality rather than optimality, platform mechanisms. A platform… 

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