Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs

  title={Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs},
  author={Daniel M{\"u}ller and Patrick W. Schmitz},
  journal={Public Choice: Public Goods eJournal},

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