Corpus ID: 55046484

Optimal Legal Standards for Competition Policy when firms do not know the social welfare implications of their actions

@inproceedings{Katsoulacos2007OptimalLS,
  title={Optimal Legal Standards for Competition Policy when firms do not know the social welfare implications of their actions},
  author={Y. Katsoulacos and D. Ulph},
  year={2007}
}
We present a welfare-based framework for the optimal choice of legal standards which encompasses decision-theoretic considerations and relates them to the underlying quality (in terms of discriminating between benign and harmful actions undertaken by firms) of economic models and information available to regulatory authorities. Our model also accounts for the Indirect Effects (or deterrence effects) caused by alternative legal standards (Joskow, 2002) as well as for Systemic Effects – delays in… Expand

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