Optimal Health Care Contract under Physician Agency

@inproceedings{HON2009OptimalHC,
  title={Optimal Health Care Contract under Physician Agency},
  author={Philippe C HON{\'E}},
  year={2009}
}
  • Philippe C HONÉ
  • Published 2009
We model asymmetric information arising from physician agency, and its effect on the design of payment and health care quantity. The physician aims to maximize a combination of physician profit and patient benefit. The degree of substitution between profit and patient benefit in the physician agency is the physician’s private information, as is the patient’s intrinsic valuation of treatment quantity. The equilibrium mechanism depends only on the physician agency parameter, and exhibits… CONTINUE READING
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