Optimal Group Size in Microlending

  title={Optimal Group Size in Microlending},
  author={Philip Protter and Alejandra Quintos},
  journal={ERN: Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis (Topic)},
Microlending, where a bank lends to a small group of people without credit histories, began with the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, and is widely seen as the creation of Muhammad Yunus, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his largely successful efforts. Since that time the model of microlending has received a fair amount of academic attention. One of the issues not yet addressed in detail, however, is the issue of the size of the group. (Some attention has nevertheless been paid… 


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