Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms ' Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes

@inproceedings{PrezCastrillo2004OptimalEP,
  title={Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms ' Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes},
  author={David P{\'e}rez-Castrillo},
  year={2004}
}
In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Figures, tables, and topics from this paper.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 33 references

Empirical Research on the Deterrent Effect of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement

  • M. A. Cohen
  • Environmental Law Institute. News & Analysis
  • 2000
Highly Influential
7 Excerpts

The Distribution of Pollution: Community Characteristics and Exposure to Air Toxics

  • N. Brooks
  • Sheti
  • 1997
Highly Influential
7 Excerpts

Firm Behavior under Imperfectly Enforceable Pollution Standards and Taxes

  • J. D. Harford
  • Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
  • 1978
Highly Influential
7 Excerpts

Optimal Environmental Taxation and Enforcement Policy”, mimeo

  • Bontems, Ph, J.-M
  • Bourgeon
  • 2001
Highly Influential
3 Excerpts

Oil Spills versus Shifting Baselines ”

  • J. M. Ruiz
  • Marine Ecology Progress Series
  • 2004

A Theory of Filtered Enforcement

  • A. Heyes
  • Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
  • 2002
1 Excerpt

Efficient Environmental Policy with Imperfect Compliance

  • A. Sandmo
  • Environmental and Resource Economics
  • 2002
2 Excerpts

A Decade of Challenges and Developments in Reforming Environmental Enforcement Agencies ”

  • A. M. Polinsky, S. Shavell
  • 2001

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…