Optimal Dissent in Organizations ∗

@inproceedings{Landier2005OptimalDI,
  title={Optimal Dissent in Organizations ∗},
  author={Augustin Landier and David Sraer and David Thesmar},
  year={2005}
}
  • Augustin Landier, David Sraer, David Thesmar
  • Published 2005
This paper is a theoretical exploration on the costs and benefits of “passive resistance” in the chain of command. In our model, the organization consists of two employees: an informed decision maker (she) in charge of selecting a project, and an uninformed implementer (he) in charge of its execution. Both employees have intrinsic and possibly differing preferences over projects. Overall success depends on both project selection and its implementation. We find that a certain level of… CONTINUE READING
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