Optimal Coordination Mechanisms for Multi-job Scheduling Games

  title={Optimal Coordination Mechanisms for Multi-job Scheduling Games},
  author={Fidaa Abed and Jos{\'e} R. Correa and Chien-Chung Huang},
We consider the unrelated machine scheduling game in which players control subsets of jobs. Each player’s objective is to minimize the weighted sum of completion time of her jobs, while the social cost is the sum of players’ costs. The goal is to design simple processing policies in the machines with small coordination ratio, i.e., the implied equilibria are within a small factor of the optimal schedule. We work with a weaker equilibrium concept that includes that of Nash. We first prove that… CONTINUE READING


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