Optimal Contracting Of New Experience Goods

@inproceedings{Deb2015OptimalCO,
  title={Optimal Contracting Of New Experience Goods},
  author={Rahul Deb},
  year={2015}
}
We model new experience goods in the context of dynamic mechanism design. These are goods for which an agent is unsure of her valuation but can learn it through consumption experience. We consider a dynamic environment with a single buyer and seller in which contracting occurs over T periods, where each time the agent consumes the object, she receives a signal which allows her to revise her valuation. In this setting, experimentation with the product is strategic both for the buyer and seller… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Topics from this paper.
2 Citations
14 References
Similar Papers

Citations

Publications citing this paper.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 14 references

Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords

  • B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, M. Schwarz
  • American Economic Review, 97:242–259
  • 2007
1 Excerpt

Position auctions

  • H. Varian
  • International Journal of Industrial Organization…
  • 2007
1 Excerpt

Bandit problems

  • D. Bergemann, J. Valimaki
  • Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper
  • 2006
1 Excerpt

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…