• Corpus ID: 12638540

Optimal Auctions with Ambiguity

@inproceedings{Bose2004OptimalAW,
  title={Optimal Auctions with Ambiguity},
  author={Subir Bose and Emre Ozdenoren and Andreas Duus Pape},
  year={2004}
}
A crucial assumption in the optimal auction literature has been that each bidder's valuation is known to be drawn from a single unique distribution. In this paper we relax this assumption and study the optimal auction problem when there is ambiguity about the distribution from which these valuations are drawn and where the seller or the bidder may display ambiguity aversion. We model ambiguity aversion using the maxmin expected utility model where an agent evaluates an action on the basis of… 
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