Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing

@article{Alaei2015OptimalAV,
  title={Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing},
  author={S. Alaei and J. Hartline and Rad Niazadeh and Emmanouil Pountourakis and Y. Yuan},
  journal={2015 IEEE 56th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science},
  year={2015},
  pages={1446-1463}
}
  • S. Alaei, J. Hartline, +2 authors Y. Yuan
  • Published 2015
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • 2015 IEEE 56th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
  • For selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values, the revenue optimal auction is complex. With respect to it, Hartline and Rough garden showed that the approximation factor of the second-price auction with an anonymous reserve is between two and four. We consider the more demanding problem of approximating the revenue of the ex ante relaxation of the auction problem by posting an anonymous price (while supplies last) and prove that their worst-case… CONTINUE READING
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