Optimal Auction Design

@article{Myerson1981OptimalAD,
  title={Optimal Auction Design},
  author={Roger B. Myerson},
  journal={Math. Oper. Res.},
  year={1981},
  volume={6},
  pages={58-73}
}
  • Roger B. Myerson
  • Published in Math. Oper. Res. 1981
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • This paper considers the problem faced by a seller who has a single object to sell to one of several possible buyers, when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object. The seller's problem is to design an auction game which has a Nash equilibrium giving him the highest possible expected utility. Optimal auctions are derived in this paper for a wide class of auction design problems. 

    Topics from this paper.

    Citations

    Publications citing this paper.
    SHOWING 1-10 OF 3,097 CITATIONS

    How to Sell to Buyers with Crossholdings

    VIEW 8 EXCERPTS
    CITES BACKGROUND & METHODS
    HIGHLY INFLUENCED

    When to Limit Market Entry under Mandatory Purchase

    VIEW 6 EXCERPTS
    CITES BACKGROUND, METHODS & RESULTS
    HIGHLY INFLUENCED

    Efficient Sequential Assignments with Randomly Arriving Multi-Item Demand Agents

    VIEW 9 EXCERPTS
    CITES BACKGROUND & METHODS
    HIGHLY INFLUENCED

    Essays on Auction Theory and Application

    VIEW 5 EXCERPTS
    CITES BACKGROUND
    HIGHLY INFLUENCED

    Fair Online Advertising

    VIEW 11 EXCERPTS
    CITES BACKGROUND & METHODS
    HIGHLY INFLUENCED

    Revenue Maximization with Imprecise Distribution

    VIEW 6 EXCERPTS
    CITES BACKGROUND & METHODS
    HIGHLY INFLUENCED

    Robustly optimal reserve price

    VIEW 8 EXCERPTS
    CITES BACKGROUND
    HIGHLY INFLUENCED

    FILTER CITATIONS BY YEAR

    1982
    2020

    CITATION STATISTICS

    • 788 Highly Influenced Citations

    • Averaged 231 Citations per year from 2017 through 2019