Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances

@article{Rosenkranz2003OptimalAO,
  title={Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R\&D Alliances},
  author={S. Rosenkranz and P. Schmitz},
  journal={CEPR Discussion Paper Series},
  year={2003}
}
We explore the dynamic evolution of property rights regimes in R&D alliances using the incomplete contract approach pioneered by Grossman, Hart and Moore (Hart and Moore, Journal of Political Economy (1990), and Grossman and Hart, Journal of Political Economy (1986)). In contrast to the standard analysis, the productive asset is an excludable public good such as a patent. Moreover, both firms can decide whether to disclose their know-how and invest effort. Know-how that has once been released… Expand

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