Optimal Algorithms for Multiwinner Elections and the Chamberlin-Courant Rule

@article{Munagala2021OptimalAF,
  title={Optimal Algorithms for Multiwinner Elections and the Chamberlin-Courant Rule},
  author={Kamesh Munagala and Zeyu Shen and Kangning Wang},
  journal={Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},
  year={2021}
}
We consider the algorithmic question of choosing a subset of candidates of a given size k from a set of m candidates, with knowledge of voters' ordinal rankings over all candidates. We consider the well-known and classic scoring rule for achieving diverse representation: the Chamberlin-Courant (CC) or 1-Borda rule, where the score of a committee is the average over the voters, of the rank of the best candidate in the committee for that voter; and its generalization to the average of the top s… 

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