Opinion control in complex networks

  title={Opinion control in complex networks},
  author={Naoki Masuda},
  journal={New Journal of Physics},
  • N. Masuda
  • Published 27 November 2014
  • Economics
  • New Journal of Physics
In many political elections, the electorate appears to be a composite of partisan and independent voters. Given that partisans are not likely to convert to a different party, an important goal for a political party could be to mobilize independent voters toward the party with the help of strong leadership, mass media, partisans, and the effects of peer-to-peer influence. Based on the exact solution of classical voter model dynamics in the presence of perfectly partisan voters (i.e., zealots… 

Continuous Influence Maximisation for the Voter Dynamics: Is Targeting High-Degree Nodes a Good Strategy?

This paper relates influence maximisation for the voting dynamics to models of network control in which external controllers interact with the intrinsic dynamics of opinion spread, and develops an algorithm to numerically solve the IM problem via gradient ascent.

Shielding and Shadowing: A Tale of Two Strategies for Opinion Control in the Voting Dynamics

An empirical numerical evaluation of two simple heuristics that are effective strategies to enhance vote shares in the voting dynamics on social networks show that optimal influence allocations tend to not be localized, but can include targeting nodes significant distances away from opposing influence.

Resisting Influence: How the Strength of Predispositions to Resist Control Can Change Strategies for Optimal Opinion Control in the Voter Model

This paper investigates this transition between hub and low-degree node control for heterogeneous undirected networks and gives analytical and numerical arguments for the existence of two control regimes.

Influence Maximization for Dynamic Allocation in Voter Dynamics

This paper studies the competition between external controllers with fixed campaign budgets in which one of the controllers attempts to maximize the share of a desired opinion in a group of agents who exchange opinions on a social network subject to voting dynamics and explores the dependence of optimal starting times on network heterogeneity.

Zealots' effect on opinion dynamics in complex networks

It is found that the time to get to the consensus state in social networks is the same for different numbers of zealots but with the same degrees of contamination with zealotry.

The Role of Active Leaders in Opinion Formation on Social Networks

The intentional polarization of opinions and controlled changes of a consensus represent potentially harmful processes for any liberal society. Within the framework of a simple model for constructive

Shadowing and shielding: Effective heuristics for continuous influence maximisation in the voting dynamics

This work focuses on optimal influence allocations against a passive opponent and compares the structure of the solutions in the continuous and discrete regimes, and investigates the game-theoretic scenario of two active opponents to show that the unique pure Nash equilibrium is to target all nodes equally.

Maintaining Ferment: On Opinion Control Over Social Networks

This work considers the design of external inputs to achieve a control objective on the opinions, represented by scalars, in a social network, and provides a numerical algorithm to derive the control function for this problem using non-smooth PMP based techniques.

Effects of Time Horizons on Influence Maximization in the Voter Dynamics

This paper analyzes influence maximization in the voter model with an active strategic and a passive influencing party in non-stationary settings and finds that on undirected heterogeneous networks, for short time horizons, influence is maximized when targeting low-degree nodes, while for long timeHorizons influence maximized is achieved when controlling hub nodes.

Depolarising Social Networks: Optimisation of Exposure to Adverse Opinions in the Presence of a Backfire Effect

The voter model in which users hold binary opinions and repeatedly update their beliefs based on others they connect with is leveraged and optimal numbers of zealots are found that maximise these quantities and it is shown that both can be efficiently increased in some cases.



Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996

I assess the extent of "partisan voting" in American national elections since 1952 using a series of simple probit analyses. My measure of partisan voting is sensitive both to changes in the

The Myth of the Independent Voter

Few events in American politics over the past two decades have generated more attention than the increasing number of voters calling themselves Independent. By the early 1970s Independents

Effect of network topology on the ordering dynamics of voter models

We introduce and study the reverse voter model, a dynamics for spin variables similar to the well‐known voter dynamics. The difference is in the way neighbors influence each other: once a node is

Social Structure and Opinion Formation

We present a dynamical theory of opinion formation that takes explicitly into account the structure of the social network in which individuals are embedded. The theory predicts the evolution of a set

Evolution of Opinions on Social Networks in the Presence of Competing Committed Groups

This work studies the more general case of opinion evolution when two groups committed to distinct, competing opinions and , and constituting fractions and of the total population respectively, are present in the network.

19 Binary Opinion Dynamics with Stubborn Agents

We study binary opinion dynamics in a social network with stubborn agents who influence others but do not change their opinions. We focus on a generalization of the classical voter model by

Binary Opinion Dynamics with Stubborn Agents

It is shown that the presence of stubborn agents with opposing opinions precludes convergence to consensus; instead, opinions converge in distribution with disagreement and fluctuations.

Optimal Opinion Control : The Campaign Problem

This article formulate and then study a novel, namely strategic perspective on such dynamics, where at least one strategic agent tries to influence the ongoing dynamics among normal agents with strategically placed opinions in such a way, that, by the end of the campaign, as much as possible normals end up with opinions in a certain interval of the opinion space.