Corpus ID: 218500427

Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling

@inproceedings{Starkov2020OnlyTW,
  title={Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling},
  author={E. Starkov and E. Dekel and Jeffrey C. Ely and Yingni Guo and N. Inostroza and Johan Lagerl{\"o}f and W. Olszewski and Ludvig Sinander},
  year={2020}
}
  • E. Starkov, E. Dekel, +5 authors Ludvig Sinander
  • Published 2020
  • Economics
  • This paper explores a model of dynamic signaling without commitment. It is known that separating equilibria do not exist in such settings because actions in any single period are too costless to mimic to be effective as signals, and the sender cannot commit to taking costly actions in the future. This paper, however, shows that informative and payoff-relevant signaling can occur even without commitment and without resorting to unreasonable off-path beliefs. Such signaling can only happen… CONTINUE READING

    References

    Publications referenced by this paper.
    SHOWING 1-10 OF 75 REFERENCES
    Trouble For Remnants
    77
    The role of Myc-induced protein synthesis in cancer.
    138
    Acute Metabolic Effects of Human Growth Hormone
    37
    Introducing programmable logic devices into digital design
    2
    An Design of the 16-Order FIR Digital Filter Based on FPGA
    13