Corpus ID: 5711543

Online learning in repeated auctions

  title={Online learning in repeated auctions},
  author={J. Weed and Vianney Perchet and P. Rigollet},
  • J. Weed, Vianney Perchet, P. Rigollet
  • Published 2016
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • ArXiv
  • Motivated by online advertising auctions, we consider repeated Vickrey auctions where goods of unknown value are sold sequentially and bidders only learn (potentially noisy) information about a good's value once it is purchased. We adopt an online learning approach with bandit feedback to model this problem and derive bidding strategies for two models: stochastic and adversarial. In the stochastic model, the observed values of the goods are random variables centered around the true value of the… CONTINUE READING

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    Publications referenced by this paper.
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