• Corpus ID: 238634469

Online Segregation

  title={Online Segregation},
  author={John Lynham and Philip R. Neary},
A large number of agents from two groups prefer to interact with their own types online and also have preferences over two online platforms. We find that an online platform can be tipped from integrated to segregated without any change in the ratio of the two groups interacting on the platform. Instead, segregation can be triggered by changes in the absolute numbers of both groups, holding the Schelling ratio fixed. In extreme cases, the flight of one group from a platform can be triggered by a… 

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