Online RPM and MFN Under Antitrust Law and Economics

@article{Akman2016OnlineRA,
  title={Online RPM and MFN Under Antitrust Law and Economics},
  author={Pınar Akman and D. Daniel Sokol},
  journal={Review of Industrial Organization},
  year={2016},
  volume={50},
  pages={133-151}
}
The legal framing of a firm’s pricing strategy can determine whether it constitutes online resale price maintenance (RPM) or online most favored nation (MFN). Together, cases that involve online RPM and MFN can be viewed as a natural experiment of how antitrust economics and law may adapt to an online world. Thus far, legal theories that have been inconsistent with economic theories have dictated enforcement across jurisdictions, which has led to confusion that thwarts potentially efficient… 

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