Corpus ID: 235421649

Online Learning of Competitive Equilibria in Exchange Economies

  title={Online Learning of Competitive Equilibria in Exchange Economies},
  author={Wenshuo Guo and Kirthevasan Kandasamy and Joseph Gonzalez and Michael I. Jordan and I. Stoica},
The sharing of scarce resources among multiple rational agents is one of the classical problems in economics. In exchange economies, which are used to model such situations, agents begin with an initial endowment of resources and exchange them in a way that is mutually beneficial until they reach a competitive equilibrium (CE). CE allocations are Pareto efficient and fair. Consequently, they are used widely in designing mechanisms for fair division. However, computing CEs requires the knowledge… Expand

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