One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control

  title={One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control},
  author={Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver Hart},
  journal={CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Acquisitions},
Corporate governance : the case the limitation of the voting rights in a listed company
This study develops a new trade-off view of corporate governance from an examination of rules that limit voting rights as a defensive measure against a hostile takeover attempt. The theoretical
Buying Shares and/or Votes for Corporate Control
We explore how allowing votes to be traded separately of shares may affect the efficiency of corporate control contests. Our basic set-up and the nature of the questions continue the work of Grossman
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The Structure of Corporate Control and Ownership in a Regulatory Environment Unbiased toward One-Share-One-Vote
This paper seeks to identify the determinants of corporate ownership and control that emerge in regulatory environments which do not inhibit the issue of shares with differential voting rights and/or
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Agency Costs of Controlling Minority Shareholders
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Recent advances in the theory of the firm suggest an important role for the market for corporate control. Along with competition in the managerial labor market, various monitoring and bonding
Corporate Control Transactions
Transactions in corporate control often produce gains for the corporation. Substitution of one set of managers for another, for example, often produces gains because assets increase in value under
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