One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence

@article{Adams2007OneSO,
  title={One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence},
  author={Ren{\'e}e B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira},
  journal={Corporate Law: Corporate Governance Law},
  year={2007}
}
We survey the empirical literature on disproportional ownership, i.e. the use of mechanisms that separate voting rights from cash flow rights in corporations. Our focus is mostly on explicit mechanisms that allow some shareholders to acquire control with less than proportional economic interest in the firm (dual-class equity structures, stock pyramids, cross-ownership, etc.), but we also briefly discuss other mechanisms, such as takeover defenses and fiduciary voting. We provide a broad… 

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