One Hundred Nuclear Wars: Stable Deterrence between the United States and Russia at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels Off Alert in the Presence of Limited Missile Defenses

  title={One Hundred Nuclear Wars: Stable Deterrence between the United States and Russia at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels Off Alert in the Presence of Limited Missile Defenses},
  author={Bruce G. Blair and Victor Esin and Matthew G. McKinzie and Valery Yarynich and Pavel Zolotarev},
  journal={Science \& Global Security},
  pages={167 - 194}
Nuclear exchange models using Monte Carlo methods were used to test the stability of U.S.-Russian deterrence for reduced nuclear force sizes off alert in the presence of missile defenses. For this study U.S. and Russian weapons were partitioned into a postulated First Echelon, consisting of single-warhead, silo-based ICBM launchers that can be generated in hours to launch-ready status, and into a postulated Second Echelon of more diverse nuclear forces including multiple-warhead, road-mobile… 

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