• Corpus ID: 8105186

Once Bitten , Twice Shy ? The Lasting Impact of IRS Audits on Individual Tax Reporting

@inproceedings{Debacker2014OnceB,
  title={Once Bitten , Twice Shy ? The Lasting Impact of IRS Audits on Individual Tax Reporting},
  author={J. Debacker and Bradley T Heim and Anh Tran and Alexander Yuskavage},
  year={2014}
}
This paper studies the impact of tax enforcement activity on subsequent individual taxpaying behavior. We exploit three waves of randomized Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audits of individual income tax filers during the 2006-2009 period to study both the short and long run effects of audits on taxpaying behavior. Rich and confidential IRS data allow us to discover several effects on post-audit taxpaying behavior. First, we find that taxpayers respond to audits by increasing reported taxable… 

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