On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems

  title={On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems},
  author={Onur Kesten},
  journal={Economic Theory},
  • Onur Kesten
  • Published 2012
  • Economics
  • Economic Theory
  • Many school districts in the US. employ centralized clearing houses to assign students to public schools. An important potential threat against any school choice mechanism is the tendency of schools to circumvent the procedure via two kinds of strategic manipulation: manipulation via capacities and manipulation via pre-arranged matches. This paper studies the extent of the vulnerability of three prominent school choice mechanisms that have been adopted (or, considered for adoption) by some… CONTINUE READING
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