On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings

  title={On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings},
  author={Jan Eeckhout},
  journal={Economics Letters},
  • J. Eeckhout
  • Published 1 October 2000
  • Economics
  • Economics Letters
Abstract A sufficient condition for uniqueness is identified on the preferences in the marriage problem, i.e. two-sided one-to-one matching with non transferable utility. For small economies this condition is also necessary. This class of preferences is broad and they are of particular relevance in economic applications. 
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