On the survival of strictly dominated strategies in large populations

@inproceedings{Palomino2001OnTS,
  title={On the survival of strictly dominated strategies in large populations},
  author={Fr{\'e}d{\'e}ric Palomino},
  year={2001}
}
This paper analyzes a model of social evolution in which (i) successful agents are imitated and (ii) each player observes payo®s realized in a ̄nite number of randomly drawn games (rather than payo®s obtained by randomly drawn players). Considering an in ̄nite random matching population, the study shows that if imitation is based on highest average payo®s realized in observed games, then, for any interior initial conditions, a pure strategy strictly dominated by a pure strategy may survive in… CONTINUE READING

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