On the supposed limits of physicalist theories of mind

@article{Dorsey2011OnTS,
  title={On the supposed limits of physicalist theories of mind},
  author={Jonathan E. Dorsey},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  year={2011},
  volume={155},
  pages={207-225}
}
  • J. Dorsey
  • Published 1 September 2011
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical Studies
Is physicalism compatible with either panpsychism or so-called “fundamental mentality”? Minimal physicalism, I contend, is compatible with both. We should therefore jettison the “No Fundamental Mentality” constraint, a proposed constraint on the definition of “the physical”, not to mention the false limits it places on physicalist theories of mind. 

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