On the soteriological significance of emptiness

  title={On the soteriological significance of emptiness},
  author={Mark Siderits},
  journal={Contemporary Buddhism},
  pages={23 - 9}
When it comes to interpreting the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā), we presently find ourselves with an embarrassment of riches. As concerns the meaning of this doctrine (as it is found in the works of Nāgārjuna and his followers), there is a wide array of competing views, with little evidence of an emerging consensus. It is nonetheless possible to see these different readings of emptiness as falling roughly into two kinds, which I shall call ‘metaphysical’ and ‘semantic’. The… 
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