# On the role of fairness and limited backward induction in sequential bargaining games

@article{Qu2015OnTR,
title={On the role of fairness and limited backward induction in sequential bargaining games},
author={Xiangyu Qu and Prashant Doshi},
journal={Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence},
year={2015},
volume={79},
pages={205-227}
}
• Published 1 March 2017
• Economics
• Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Experiments show that in sequential bargaining games (SℬG$\mathcal {SBG}$), subjects usually deviate from game-theoretic predictions. Previous explanations have focused on considerations of fairness in the offers, and social utility functions have been formulated to model the data. However, a recent explanation by Ho and Su (Manag. Sci. 59(2), 452–469 2013) for observed deviations from game-theoretic predictions in sequential games such as the Centipede game is that players engage in limited…

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